Uncertainty clouds the continuity of the Pretoria Agreement, as disagreement between Ethiopia’s federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) has led to its de-registration amidst this week’s looming deadline to hold a congress.
As per the Pretoria Agreement, which ended the two-year Tigray war, Ethiopia’s federal government lifted the Tigray People’s Liberation Front’s (TPLF) terrorist designation, but the election board has dragged its feet, citing a legal gap.
Last August, the board registered the TPLF as a new party, with the requirement that it hold a congress under its supervision by the deadline set for this week. Although initially ambivalent, the party later rejected the requirement, arguing that it treated the 50-year-old party as if it were newly formed.
Technical dispute?
The seemingly technical dispute is yet another symptom of the deteriorating relations. Both sides have been exchanging accusations for months, each accusing the other of trying to sabotage their interests and obstructing the peace deal.
The TPLF’s leadership has warned that Ethiopia’s federal government severing ties with the party could lead to a breakdown in federal-Tigray relations. Coupled with the federal government’s wish to shelve the peace deal, this serves as another stark reminder of the fragility of the peace process and the urgent need to address its flaws.
The cessation of hostilities agreement signed in Pretoria, South Africa, in November 2022, under the auspices of the African Union, ended the two-year-long Tigray war in which Ethiopian troops and allied Eritrean and Amhara forces committed egregious atrocities.
It envisaged, among others, the restoration of services, withdrawal of non-federal troops from Tigray, disarmament, and an inclusive interim regional administration.
Tensions peaked in March when TPLF hardliners and affiliated armed officers violently ousted the president of the interim administration. The federal government’s reaction was muted, and the replacement was a leader acceptable to the TPLF.
But it framed the appointment as its unilateral power and made a selective list of tasks for the administration, with no reference to the peace deal.
TPLF self-serving arguments
TPLF hardliners were initially bitter about the peace deal’s stipulation of an inclusive interim administration, deeming it a threat to TPLF’s entrenched political monopoly. Lately, they have pivoted to self-serving arguments asserting a special status in the region and in determining the fate of the Pretoria peace agreement.
The argument is that the peace deal is the only valid legal link between the federal government and Tigray.
As the named signatory representing Tigray, the party holds exclusive authority over its implementation. In effect, TPLF would have full regional power – overriding the interim administration – and constrained only by its negotiations with the federal government.
Recently, the TPLF chairperson, Debretsion Gebremichael, expanded the argument and claimed the TPLF was recognised by the peace deal and is governed solely by the Pretoria agreement. He warned that if the federal government uses the National Election Board of Ethiopia’s (NEBE) decision as grounds “to exclude the TPLF from the peace process or the interim administration, it would amount to a severance of federal-Tigray ties”.
The federal government has consistently ignored TPLF’s claim to an exclusive role in implementing the peace deal, instead confining its involvement to inter-party dialogue and organisational matters. TPLF’s frustration culminated in a sharply worded statement issued in March.
Piecemeal approach to implementation
Ironically, the federal government might agree that the TPLF’s de-registration nullifies the peace agreement. It has long sought to avoid review panels and monitoring mechanisms, preferring a piecemeal approach to implementation rather than treating the agreement as a comprehensive package.
This could now provide additional grounds to argue that the deal has been rendered obsolete, with any remaining obligations left to state institutions.
But the peace deal should not be beholden to the institutional interests of the two parties. Though it refers to TPLF as a signatory party, it primarily binds Tigray as a territorial entity. Several components – such as the protection of civilians and the removal of non-federal troops from Tigray – are framed as state-level commitments that bind the federal government regardless of the existence of its co-signatory.
Drawing on the lessons from similar cases, the survival of a peace agreement does not hinge on the continued existence of an insurgent group.
Sudan’s 2005 and Colombia’s 2016 peace deals endured, despite the fragmentation of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the transformation of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC) into a civilian political party, respectively, through joint governance structures, institutionalised obligations, and international oversight. In contrast, Angola’s 1994 peace deal collapsed as it was crafted as a party-centric instrument.
Displacement and suffering continue in Tigray
The peace deal can – and should – survive.
The past two and a half years offer little assurance about the commitment the two parties have signed up for, as they have been unable to accommodate each other, let alone advance sustainable peace. To contain spillover effects, the peace process needs to be decoupled from their bilateral relations, which require genuine engagement, including the reinstatement of the TPLF’s pre-war legal status.
But there are bigger issues at stake. At present, nearly a million Tigrayans remain displaced, about 250,000 await the demobilisation process, and hundreds of thousands in Western Tigray and other areas continue to suffer under occupying Eritrean and Amhara troops. These interlinked issues require a synchronised implementation matrix.
Regardless of the political motive of the federal government – and sympathetic mediators – to designate the TPLF rather than Tigray’s administration as the signatory party, it was a war against the Tigrayan polity as a whole and needs to be addressed accordingly. Hence, it is necessary to reinforce the legitimacy and continuity of the peace process through institutional anchoring.
To this end, a Declaratory Statement must be issued by the federal government, Tigray’s interim administration, and the AU, reaffirming the agreement’s validity and continuity as well as naming the recently established multi-stakeholder interim council of Tigray as a counterparty.
The AU and western partners could make up for their passivity and ineffectual facilitation by advocating for greater inclusivity of the interim administration, the expedited removal of non-federal troops, and progress in the demobilisation process, as well as by mediating the TPLF’s legal status, given its potential to spoil the process.